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Introduction
Starting in 2005, the EU will introduce an EU-wide carbon emissions trading system to promote cost-efficiency of aggregate EU emission abatement (EU 2003) . By implementing the EU Directive, the first multi-national trading scheme will become operative. The envisaged trading scheme represents part of the EU efforts to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 8 % by 2008-2012 (as committed We show that these provisions of the Directive, namely efficiency and the free allocation of allowances, are in conflict with the goal of harmonized allowance allocation rules. Each Member State is required by the EU Directive to lay down these rules in National Allocation
Plans. Within the National Allocation Plans, each Member State (i) fixes the quantity of allowances it intends to allocate to installations covered by the Directive (allocation budget), and (ii) states rules to assign these allowances to the respective installations (allocation mechanism). Complementary abatement policies must be pursued in the sectors not covered by the Directive to balance the countries' emissions budgets which are given by the EU burden sharing agreement (EU 1999) . The National Allocation Plans will be scrutinized by the Commission with respect to "common criteria" such as competitive distortions (Annex III, EU 2003) . However, as there is no explicit harmonization of allocation plans across countries, concerns persist that differences in the assignment of free emission allowances to firms could distort competition.
1 Note that the EU Directive will become effective independent of the enactment of the Kyoto Protocol which still requires the (rather uncertain) ratification by Russia.
Whereas such distortions from a more narrow economic perspective, i.e. in terms of overall efficiency losses, can be prevented by relying on lump-sum allocation mechanisms, 2 Woerdman (2001 Woerdman ( , 2003 identifies different implicit financial (lump-sum) transfers to similar firms and the resulting distortion of the `level playing field' as a competitive distortion from the legal point of view.
Utilizing this definition, we illustrate by means of a simple partial analytical model that distortions are inherent to the setup of the European emissions trading system as envisaged under the EU Directive. Different from one-jurisdictional trading schemes like the U.S. SO 2 market, reaching efficiency with free allowances implies that identical firms operating in different countries will generally receive different emission assignments. That is, the assignment factor -for example in an emissions-based (grandfathering) allocation scheme -is endogenous in each country. Due to this endogeneity, any harmonization of assignment factors to preserve "competition neutrality" has to go along with country-specific adjustments in the allocation rules. Concretely, we illustrate that uniform assignment factors can be reached without affecting economic efficiency through changes in the prescription of free allocation. As an alternative, country-specific allocation budgets could be adjusted. However, such an adjustment will typically induce inefficient emission levels in at least some sectors.
The Endogeneity Problem
We use a simple partial two-sector, multi-region model to illustrate the problem of endogeneity and competitive distortions within the multi-jurisdictional setting of the EU Directive. Each region r can allocate an overall exogenous emission budget r E 3 to either installations in the sectors covered by the Directive or to the remaining sectors of the region.
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Whereas the former are eligible for international emissions trading (TRD), the latter will not 2 The allowance allocation may not be affected by (upcoming) firms' decisions -see Böhringer and Lange (2003a, b) for a recent discussion of dynamic allocation rules and the implicit trade-off between economic efficiency and compensation. 3 In the EU case, the aggregate emission targets are given by the EU burden sharing agreement which distributes the EU-wide Kyoto emission target across individual Member States (EU 1999 · The larger the overall emission target r E , the larger the assignment factor will be.
· The larger the emission budget for the NTR sectors, the smaller the allocation budget for the TRD sectors and, hence, the smaller the assignment factor will be. , r r . Unless regions were to be fully symmetric, this poses a trade-off between "rule neutrality" and "competition neutrality" since the adaptation of the same rules for determining the allocation budget and the allocation metric generally imposes different assignment factors for identical firms in different regions.
Cost-efficient Design of National Allocation Plans
According to the EU Directive, Member States -in setting up the National Allocation Plansfirst have to decide on the allocation budget, i.e. the aggregate number of (free) allowances they set aside for the trading sectors. The simplest proposal (see e.g. DIW et al. 2003) involves a uniform reduction in percental emissions across trading and non-trading sectors based on historic emission levels. In this case, the assignment factor to trading sectors in 7 For an analysis of distortionary output-and emission-based allocation in a dynamic setting see Lange (2003a,b) and Fischer (2001) . In the German debate on the National allocation plan, some more sophisticated non-uniform emission-based allocation schemes have been proposed which account for sector-specific characteristics and early action. By requiring more sector-specific information, however, differentiated rates lead to more possibilities for lobbying by sector-specific interest groups (Stavins 1998, p.79) . The resulting sector-specific assignment factors cannot prevent the described endogeneity problem. 8 In particular, this implies that firms in regions that had faced a stricter historic regulation (or early action etc. ) will be partly compensated by higher transfers compared to other regions. Given identical historic emissions levels, a firm in The Netherlands would thus be assigned nearly four times the number of allowances given to the Danish firm. 
Obviously, such an uneven treatment justifies major concerns regarding "competition neutrality" and stronger claims for a (at least partial) harmonization of assignment factors.
Ensuring "Competition Neutrality"
In our discussion of the endogeneity problem, we assumed "rule neutrality" in the sense that each government (i) implements the optimal (least-cost) emission level in sectors not covered by the Directive and (ii) allocates all of its remaining emission allowances for free to the The final column of Table 1 reports the necessary fraction of auctioning in EU Member
States if the harmonized assignment factor were based on the minimal Danish factor (0.34).
The auctioned fraction is largest for the U.K., the Netherlands, and Finland with more than 70 %. In our concrete numerical example, all auctioning rates (except for the minimum Danish one) conflict with the prescriptions of the current EU Directive in which only a maximum of 5 % (10 % ) may be auctioned off. 
Conclusions
We have shown that it is generally impossible to retain efficiency when requiring free allocation of allowances and non-discrimination of firms across countries. Thus, the stated objectives of the European Directive -efficiency, harmonization ("rule neutrality" and "competition neutrality"), and free allocation of allowances -are incompatible. Along the policy-relevant example of lump-sum grandfathering, we illustrated the huge differences in (endogenous) assignment factors which give rise to major concerns regarding competitive distortions from a legal point of view. In our simple partial model the associated differing transfers do not affect firms' emission choice and overall economic efficiency. However, in a more complex setting that incorporates income effects, economic distortions may also be non-negligible.
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An efficient way out of the current regulation dilemma posed by the multiple objectives of the EU Directive could be to relax the requirement of free allocation. Then, the minimal fraction of allowances which must be allocated is given by the minimum of assignment factors across EU Member States. As a mean to heading towards a more harmonized allocation of allowances, a continuous increase of the auctioned ratio of tradable allowances may prove a realistic policy option. 
A.1. Non-technical model description
For determining the country-specific assignment factors r l as reported in Table 1 we make use of a 15-region, 9-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the EU economy calibrated to empirical data. At the sectoral level the model incorporates sufficient details on differences in factor intensities, degrees of factor substitutability and price elasticities of output demand in order to trace back the structural change induced by carbon abatement policies. The sectors in the model have been carefully selected to keep the most carbon-intensive sectors in the available data as separate as possible. Table A .1 provides an overview of the sectors represented in the model. The energy goods identified in the model include primary carriers (coal, natural gas, crude oil) and secondary energy carriers (refined oil products and electricity). Furthermore, the model features three energy-intensive non-energy sectors (iron and steel; paper, pulp and printing; non-ferrous III metals) whose installations -in addition to the secondary energy branches (refined oil products and electricity) -are subject to the EU emissions trading Directive. The remaining manufacturers and services are aggregated to a composite industry that produces a non-energy-intensive macro good. The non-electric energy composite in turn is a CES function of coal, crude oil, refined oil, and natural gas. In the production of fossil fuels, all inputs, except for the sector-specific fossil fuel resource, are aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. At the top level, this aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a constant elasticity of substitution. The latter is calibrated in consistency with exogenous price elasticities of fossil fuel supply.
Final consumption demand C r in each region is determined by a representative agent RA r , who maximizes consumption subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment. Aggregate consumption of the representative agent is given as a CES composite which combines composite energy consumption with a non-energy consumption bundle. Trade between regions is specified using the Armington approach of product heterogeneity, so domestic and foreign goods of the same variety are distinguished by origin.
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The Armington composite A ir for a traded good is a CES function of an imported composite M ir and domestic production for that sector. The import composite is then a CES function of an EU import composite and imports from the rest of the world (ROW). The EU import composite of a specific EU region in turn is a CES function of production from all other EU countries. EU countries are assumed to be price-takers with respect to world market prices, i.e. ROW import-supply functions and ROW export-demand functions are perfectly elastic.
There is an imposed balance of payment constraint to ensure trade balance between the EU and ROW through a flexible exchange rate. That is, the value of imports from the ROW to the EU must equal the value of exports from the EU to the ROW after accounting for the benchmark trade deficit or surplus of EU regions.
The effects of exogenous policy changes are measured with respect to a reference situation. In our comparative-static analysis, the reference situation is captured by economic transactions in a particular benchmark year (here: 1997). As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, benchmark quantities and prices -together with exogenous elasticities (see Table A .7 below) -determine the parameters of functional forms. For this model calibration, we employ the GTAP-5E database (McDougall 1999) 13 which provides most recent consistent accounts of regional production and consumption, bilateral trade and energy flows for up to 66 countries and 23 commodities.
A.2 Algebraic model description
The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear inequalities. These inequalities correspond to two classes of equilibrium conditions: zero profit and market clearance. The fundamental unknowns of the system are two vectors: activity levels and prices. In equilibrium, each of these variables is linked to one inequality condition: an activity level to a zero-profit condition and a commodity (factor) price to a market-clearance condition.
In the algebraic exposition below, the notation z ir P is used to denote the (zero-)profit function of sector j in region r where z is the name assigned to the associated production activity. Differentiating the profit function with respect to input and output prices provides compensated demand and supply coefficients (Hotellings's lemma), which appear subsequently in the market clearance conditions. We use i (aliased with j) as an index for commodities (sectors) and r (aliased with s) as an index for regions. The label EG represents the set of energy goods and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil fuels. Tables A.2 -A.7 explain the notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic exposition. 
is the associated activity variable.
3. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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where ir E is the associated activity variable.
Armington aggregate:
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A is the associated activity variable.
5. Aggregate imports across import regions: In order to evaluate the sensitivity of our core simulation results with respect to uncertainties in the elasticity space we have conducted 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. In each simulation, values for six elasticities (trade elasticities, energy demand elasticities and fossil fuel supply elasticities) that are key determinants for the economic adjustment associated with carbon emission constraints are drawn from uniform probability distributions around the model central values (see Table A .7 in Appendix A). Table B .1 provides a statistical summary of results for the cost-efficient emission allocation to the non-trading sectors (and, thus, also to the trading sectors), the assignment factors as well as the share of tradable allowances that must be auctioned within each region in order to preserve competition neutrality. It is obvious that all of our central case CGE estimates remain very robust even when accounting for substantial uncertainty in the parameterization space. 
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